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Abstract
 This paper takes advantage of the tax planning approach of Scholes and Wolfson (1992) and clarifi es 
the implication of the tax deferral in the corporate tax policy. If corporations accumulate profi ts 
internally, it would lead to the ineffi cient use of capital. The actual tax laws of many countries deal 
with this problem. But in Japan, this issue is not well compensated by the tax law. To clarify the 
behavior of tax payers in Japan, the government should disclose the tax return information so that 
empirical research would be the basis of sound tax policy and economic growth.
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????????????????
Corporate taxation is important issue in the policy of public fi nance and taxation. Many countries 
lower the tax rate for corporations to promote economic growth. For example, OECD (2008) 
recommends Japan to lower tax rates in this regard. Although OECD (2008) analyzes the tax law in 
Japan, they do not consider the certain issue in the corporate taxation in their policy recommendation. 
This paper takes advantage of the tax planning approach of Scholes and Wolfson (1992) and clarifi es the 
implication of the tax deferral in the corporate tax policy. In this paper, we analyze how tax rules affect 
the decision making of tax payers. It sheds lights on the issue which is ignored in the ordinary 
econometric analysis. The policy issue in this paper is indispensable not only for Japan but also for the 
countries with lower growth and aging economies.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
To analyze the function of corporate tax, we take advantage of the tax planning approach. Following 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992), we start with the return analysis with and without the corporate tax. 
If a person does her business as a sole proprietor, she makes a return of R over investment of $1, with 
individual income tax rate of Tp and investment period of n. Then the return after tax is 
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[1?R(1?Tp)]
n (1)
If a person incorporates her business and the government does not impose the corporate tax and 
imposes only the individual income tax, then we have an issue of tax deferral. Assume the capital gain 
tax is Tg. If the corporation accumulates profi ts for n period and the owner sells the shares of the 
corporation, the return after tax is
(1?R)n−Tg{(1?R)n−1}=(1?R)n(1−Tg)?Tg? (2)
Without the corporate tax, the owner may defer the tax payment while the corporation accumulates 
profi ts for n period. Thus, the owner may achieve the higher returns with incorporated business in this 
environment. In order to avoid the deferral of individual income tax, governments in most countries 
impose corporate tax.
If corporate tax is levied and the corporate tax rate is Tc, then the return after tax is 
[1?R(1?Tc)]
n?Tg{[1?R(1−Tc)]
n
−1}
???????[1?R(1?Tc)]
n
(1?Tg)?Tg
 
(3)
If the corporation is taxed on their income, it is not always to be benefi cial for owners to incorporate 
their business. Whether expression (1) provides greater after-tax rates of return than does the expression 
(3) depends on four factors; 1) the individual ordinary income tax rate Tp, 2) the corporate tax rate Tc, 3) 
the capital gain tax rate Tg, 4) the length of investment horizon. (Scholes and Wolfson [1992])
Specifi cally, if the corporate tax rate Tc is smaller than the individual ordinary tax rate Tp and the 
capital gain tax rate Tg = 0, then the investing through the corporation dominates the investing as a sole 
proprietor. 
If the corporate tax rate Tc is smaller than the individual ordinary tax rate Tp and the capital gain tax 
rate is positive, then the ranking of organizational form is ambiguous. The preferred choice depends on 
the parameters.
Depending on the parameters, that person has incentives to incorporate her business to receive the 
higher returns. That would encourage the taxpayers to take the risk in a corporate entrepreneurship. 
But we might have other scenario in this setting. A person might set up a corporation to save taxes in 
the existing business. In this case, the tax revenue would be lower for the government but taxpayers do 
not take more risk to start business. If this kind of behavior prevails in the economy, lowering corporate 
tax rates might not promote growth. 
U.S. tax code has a special provision which prevents the tax abuse of ‘incorporated portfolio.’ The 
provision is called Personal Holding Company Tax. If corporate tax rates are lower than individual rates, 
an individual has an incentive to organize a corporation to hold investment assets so that interest and 
dividends would be taxed at the lower rates.  The provision penalizes the accumulating profi ts originating 
from passive sources such as dividends, interest, royalties and rents for family-owned fi rms. Thus, with 
this provision, lower corporate tax encourages the true entrepreneurship rather than tax savings with the 
corporate entity. 
Above-mentioned return analysis assumes the sale of shares after accumulating profits in the 
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corporation. Next, we analyze the rates of return if the profi ts are distributed through dividends following 
Kaneda (2009) but in a different setting. 
If the corporation retains earnings of $1 and put $1 into the investment project which provides return 
of Ri over $1 investment. The tax rate for dividend income and corporate income is Tp and Tc 
respectively. Corporate tax is levied on income from investment. When dividends are distributed, the tax 
rate on dividends is applied. Thus, the rate of return is
[1?Ri(1?Tc)]
m
(1?Tp)? (4)
If the dividends of $1 are paid out of corporation at fi rst, then distributions are taxed as dividend 
income and the after-tax-amount is invested in the outside project which provides rate of return of Ro. 
Then the income from the outside project is subject to individual income tax of Tp. Then the rate of 
return is 
(1?Tp)[1?Ro(1?Tp)]
m? (5)
If Tc is lower than Tp, the owner of the corporation might be indifferent between expression (3) and 
expression (4) even under the condition that Ri (rate of inside investment) <Ro (rate of outside 
investment). In this tax system of “double-taxation,” we would have the less effi cient use of capital.
Friedman (1962) points out, “This tax structure encourages retention of corporate earnings. Even if 
the return that can be earned internally is appreciably less than the return that the stockholder himself 
could earn by investing the funds externally, it may pay to invest internally because of the tax saving.” 
Friedman (1962) seems to assume that the profi ts would be retained indefi nitely. If we assume that the 
corporation retains the profi ts indefi nitely, we replace return R by Ri in the expression (3) and it is.
[1?Ri(1?Tc)]
n
(1?Tg)?Tg (6)
In this case, the difference in rate of return between two cases might be larger.
These incentives are results of “double-taxation.” If the corporation distributes its profi ts as dividends, 
it pays dividends from after-tax profi ts and dividends are also taxed at individual level. If investors try to 
avoid paying taxes at all costs, this problem might be severer than the above-mentioned models imply. 
For example, Scholes and Wolfson (1992) emphasize that the tax planner should maximize their returns 
rather than minimize their taxes. This description might imply that tax payers defer the tax payment on 
corporate distribution while sacrifi cing their returns.
In many countries, the tax code has some provisions to mitigate the effect of the “double-taxation.”
Kaneda (2009) analyzes the tax system of fi fteen countries examining the professional tax guides of 
CCH. 
One option to mitigate the effect of this “double-taxation” is the imputation system1). In this system, 
shareholders are taxed on dividends, but they may deduct from individual tax due their share of corporate 
tax.  Double taxation is mitigated in this regard and the incentive of shareholders to retain earnings in 
corporations is reduced. 
1) The analysis of tax system is based on Kaneda (2009).
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There are other options to mitigate double taxation. Dividend exclusion is other option. Corporate tax 
is levied on the corporate profi ts but dividends are not taxed at individual level. There is no “double 
taxation” in this scheme. 
Kaneda (2009) summarizes the tax system of several countries with respect to double taxation in Table 1.
Countries with dividend exclusion regime are Argentina, Hong Kong and Singapore. Countries with 
imputation system regime are Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In Canada and Hong Kong, corporate 
rates are higher than individual rates and there is little incentive to incorporate business to take advantage 
of lower rates. In France, maximum individual rate is 40% but aggregate taxable income is divided by 
family quotient which refl ects the family situation. Then tax payable on the result is computed and then 
multiplied by family quotient. In this way, tax payable is calculated in favor of larger family and 
effective tax rates for a family with a couple and children are lower. In China, there is neither imputation 
system nor dividend exclusion but the GDP growth rates are close to double digits and it is more likely 
for many fi rms to be in short of capital to grow their business.
Some countries have neither dividend exclusion not imputation system but accumulated earnings tax. 
This tax provision is designed to prevent the deferral of tax payment with earnings retained in the 
corporations. If one corporation accumulates the earnings beyond certain level, the surtax may apply to that 
corporation. In this way, the corporations have disincentives to retain purely for tax avoidance purposes. In 
the Japanese tax code, accumulated earnings tax is applicable to family-owned companies which are 
defi ned as a company, over 50% of whose shares are owned directly or indirectly by one share holder.
Table 1 shows that there are fi ve countries that have the provisions of accumulated earnings tax. Those 
countries are Ireland, Philippine, Singapore, United States and Japan. But after the Japanese tax reform 
of 2007, small and mid-sized enterprises whose equity capital is ¥100 million or less are not subject to 
this special surtax of Accumulated Earnings Tax. In Japan, there is no provision to prevent the deferral of 
corporate distributions for the tax avoidance purposes for small and mid-sized enterprises at this 
moment. Similarly, in Germany, Italy and U.K., there are incentives to defer tax payment for the 
distribution of corporate profi ts and there may be some need to mitigate the tax abuse to achieve effi cient 
use of the capitals. 
The issue of “double taxation” and accumulated earnings tax is important in the tax policy. 
Accumulating excessive earnings beyond business needs defers tax payment. It provides tax savings to 
the tax payers without making capital investments and hiring employees for business activities. If 
funding is tight in fi nancial crisis or recession, corporations might use the government lending facilities 
or credit guarantee rather than accumulating excessive earnings. It would improve the effi cient use of 
capital and promote growth in the economy as a whole. The tax policy should consider this issue not 
only in Japan but in the aging economies in general. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
OECD (2008) recommends Japan to lower corporate tax while broadening the tax base to promote 
economic growth. But it does not point out the problem of accumulating excessive earnings in the small 
and mid-sized corporations. 
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OECD (2008) cites the analysis of Uemura and Maekawa (2000). They show that cut in corporate tax 
and enterprise tax rates resulted in an increase in business investment. But their analysis is based on the 
data of listed fi rms. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) imply that public fi rms exhibit less aggressive tax 
behavior because of higher non-tax costs arising from capital market pressure or agency costs2). As 
previously mentioned, small and mid-sized companies may save taxes without taking risks in the real 
business. They do not have to take risks to be penalized by the tax authorities, because the application of 
accumulated earnings tax in Japan is based on bright-line test. It would not be appropriate for policy 
makers to extend the empirical results of listed fi rms to private fi rms under the current tax system. 
The corporate governance of both public and private fi rm is important to promote growth. It is related 
to the decision making how the economic resources are allocated. The corporations make decisions 
about new products, new factories and dividend payments and acquisition of other fi rms to maximize the 
shareholders’ value under the sound corporate governance. 
Private companies face the issue of corporate governance too. But they might have incentives to 
accumulate earnings beyond economic needs depending on the non-tax costs of internal control, public 
disclosure and reputation. To make tax collection, the government would be the uninvited stakeholder of 
private companies. With implementing the accumulated earnings tax and other tax provision to mitigate 
the effect of “double-taxation”, the government would be able to make private fi rms to distribute the 
economic resources to the shareholders. Distributed resources may be invested in new business and/or 
capital investment or may be used to hire employees. It would increase the effi ciency of capital use in 
the whole economy. This might be the extended version of the corporate governance. The issue is 
signifi cant not only for Japan but for all countries which have the issue of effi cient capital use.
To get a clear picture how the tax payers behave in the tax policy change, it is essential to make the 
relevant information available to the academic researchers. As far as the authors are concerned, the 
Japanese government does not provide the tax data including the tax return data to the academic researchers 
as in the United States. This is one of the reasons why we do not have extensive empirical research in the 
tax area with respect to private fi rms in Japan. Providing the tax return information with disclosure 
protection would improve the research in this area and provide the sound basis for Japanese tax policy.
??????????????????????
We analyze the effect of tax deferral with the tax planning approach of Scholes and Wolfson (1992). 
We showed that fi rms may save taxes while accumulating profi ts internally. But these behaviors would 
lead to the ineffi cient use of capital. The actual tax laws of many countries deal with this problem with 
various tax provisions. But in Japan and some other countries, this issue is not well compensated by the 
tax law. Thus, the effect of lowering corporate tax rates is not well documented in the existing literature. 
In order to have the better picture, the Japanese government should disclose the tax return information 
with disclosure protection to the academic researchers. The information disclosure would lead to the 
2) Chen et al. (2010) argue that family owner of public fi rms would be less tax aggressive because of non-tax costs such 
as the potential price discount and reputation damage.
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extensive empirical literature in this area and it provides the basis for the sound tax policy in Japan.
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#Table 1 is from Kaneda (2009).
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